We consider a class of decomposition methods for variational inequalities, which is related to the classical Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition of linear programs. Our approach is rather general, in that it can be used with set-valued or nonmonotone operators, as well as various kinds of approximations in the subproblems of the functions and derivatives in the single-valued case. Also, subproblems can be solved approximately. Convergence is established under reasonable assumptions. We also report numerical experiments for computing variational equilibria of the game-theoretical models of electricity markets. Our numerical results illustrate that the decomposition approach allows to solve large-scale problem instances otherwise untractable if the popular PATH solver is applied directly, without decomposition.
Introduction
Let F : R n ⇒R n be a set-valued function from R n to the subsets of R n , and let S h and S g be two closed convex sets in R n . We consider the variational inequality problem VI(F, S h ∩ S g ) [12] , which means to find x ∈ S h ∩ S g such that w, x −x ≥ 0 for somew ∈ F (x) and all x ∈ S h ∩ S g .
In what follows, we assume that S h = {x : h(x) ≤ 0} with h : R n → R q being convex and differentiable, and S g is a generic closed convex set which is easier (in some sense) to handle than the set S h and the intersection S h ∩ S g . The set S h is defined by inequality constraints only for simplicity; affine equality constraints can be introduced in our developments without any difficulties. We assume that the operator F is either single-valued and continuous (possibly nonmonotone) or it is maximal monotone, i.e., it is monotone (it holds that u − v, x − y ≥ 0 for all x, y ∈ dom F = {z : F (z) = ∅} and all u ∈ F (x), v ∈ F (y)) and its graph is not contained in the graph of any other monotone operator. We also assume that VI(F, S h ∩ S g ) has a nonempty solution set, and that S g ⊂ int(dom F ). We note that the latter assumption could be more general; we use the stated one for simplicity, as the issue does not seem to be of real importance in a paper devoted to a computational algorithm. The setting just described suggests trying to deal with the constraint sets S h and S g separately, i.e., by some type of decomposition of the problem VI(F, S h ∩S g ). Many decomposition techniques (for monotone problems) are explicitly derived from the proximal point method [27, 30] for maximal monotone operators, e.g., [36, 8, 37, 39] . Sometimes the relation to the proximal iterates is less direct, e.g., the methods in [4, 9, 38, 18, 29] , which were nevertheless more recently generalized and interpreted in [34, 25] within the hybrid inexact proximal schemes of [35, 28] . The methods cited above assume monotonicity and, from the beginning, some rather specific separable structure in the mapping F and/or in the constraints defining the feasible set. In that sense, our setting VI(F, S h ∩ S g ) and the subsequent developments are more general, as in the single-valued case F is allowed to be nonmonotone and no specific structural assumptions are being made about F or the constraints. That said, if separable features are present, they can be exploited at the stage of solving the subproblems.
The decomposition approach in this paper is of the type of the Dantzig-Wolfe technique for linear programming [6] , which we recall next. Given the affine functions f : R n → R, h : R n → R p and g : R n → R q (there is no need to define them here explicitly), consider the linear program min f (x) s.t. h(x) ≤ 0, g(x) ≤ 0.
Note that this problem is equivalent to VI(f , S h ∩ S g ), where f is the gradient of f , the set S h is defined above, and S g = {x : g(x) ≤ 0}. Assuming that the structure of the problem data is such that linear optimization over the set S g can be carried out easily (as compared to minimizing over S h ∩ S g ), the idea of the Dantzig-Wolfe method is to perform the Lagrangian relaxation of the h-constraints, and to apply the cutting-plane algorithm [2, Sec. 9. 
When set in an iterative framework, Dantzig-Wolfe method means the following. Given the current dual iterate µ k M ∈ R q + , the k-th subproblem consists of computing the value of the dual function θ(µ k M ), which means obtaining a minimizer x k+1 S for the linear program in (3) . By construction, x k+1 S ∈ S g and we have a subgradient −h(x k+1 S ) ∈ ∂(−θ)(µ k M ) (where ∂(−θ) denotes the subdifferential of the convex function −θ). For k ≥ 1, suppose we have computed solutions of the previous subproblems {x 0 S , . . . , x k S } ⊂ S g . Then the k-th master problem replaces the set S g in the original problem (2) by the approximation conv{x 0 S , . . . , x k S }, where conv D stands for the convex hull of the set D, and solves the following linear program:
where Ω k+1 = {α ∈ R The Dantzig-Wolfe approach for linear programs is particularly effective when h is the coupling constraint without which the minimization in (3) decomposes further according to some favorable (block-separable) structure of g. For some large-scale applications of this type, the resulting method is faster than solving the original linear program (2) directly, e.g., [16, 14] . Stabilization techniques of bundle methods [2, Ch. 10] can be used to define stabilized master problems and improve computational performance of the cutting-plane scheme [1, 3] . Let us now go back to the variational problem (1). As is well known, it is equivalent to the inclusion 0 ∈ F (x) + N S h ∩Sg (x), where by N D (x) we denote the normal cone to the convex set D at the point x, i.e., N D (x) = {v : v, u − x ≤ 0 ∀u ∈ D} if x ∈ D and N D (x) = ∅ otherwise. Letx ∈ S h ∩ S g . Under appropriate constraint qualification conditions for the sets S h and S g , it holds that N S h ∩Sg (x) = N S h (x) + N Sg (x) and N S h (x) = {u : u = [h (x)] µ, µ ∈ R q + , µ ⊥ h(x)}, where the notation u ⊥ v means that u, v = 0. In particular, for any solutionx of (1), there exists a multiplierμ ∈ R q + such that
Hence, solving problem (1) is equivalent to finding (x,μ) such that
A natural extension of the ideas of the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition to this variational setting is then the following. Using the current multiplier estimate µ k M ∈ R q + (instead of the unknown "optimal"μ), the k-th subproblem solves a variational inequality with the structure in (5) , to obtain a new primal point x k+1 S . In particular, this variational problem is over the simpler set S g , with the h-constraint dealt with in a manner similar to the Lagrangian relaxation approach. Using solutions of the previous subproblems {x 0 S , . . . , x k S } ⊂ S g , the k-th master problem solves a variational inequality with the structure in (1), except that the set S g therein is approximated by conv {x 0 S , . . . , x k S } (recall (4)). This gives a solution x k+1 M and a new multiplier estimate µ k+1 M ∈ R q + for the h-constraint, and the process is repeated. Thus, we iteratively generate two sequences of (approximate) solutions of the problems (1) and (5), using at each iteration the solution of one problem to improve the solution of the other. We shall postpone the details and various possible options to be discussed later.
A Dantzig-Wolfe method along these lines had been introduced for (single-valued) variational inequalities in [15, 5] . In [15] some restrictive assumptions are employed. For example, F is required to be either strictly monotone or to be a separable combination of a strictly monotone part with a gradient of a differentiable convex function. The subproblems have the specific form VI(
). Also, the solvability of all the subproblems is an assumption. Some of the restrictive assumptions have been alleviated in [5] , where also a useful feature of approximating F in the subproblems is introduced. The latter can be helpful in applications where the subproblem VI(
) is not decomposable, but using instead of F a suitable approximation makes it decomposable and thus easier to solve. One possibility considered in [5] is fixing the value of F at the last master solution, i.e., solving VI(F (
The other possibility uses a Jacobi-like approximation, where only some components of F are fixed at their values at x k M . In this paper, we shall also consider other approximations, for example of the Josephy-Newton type [17] , which approximates F (·) in the smooth single-valued case by
We shall also allow combinations of various approximations. In fact, in our numerical results in Section 4, we found that the combination of the Newtonian and Jacobi approximations works best for large problems of the structure considered there. In addition, and as compared to [15, 5] , our framework also allows for approximations to the derivative h ; does not assume solvability of the subproblems; allows for inexact solutions of subproblems; gives an option of generating (cheap) additional cuts by projecting a selection of previous iterates using separation ideas [22, 33] ; and can handle the general case of F being set-valued.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally state the algorithm and discuss the approximation options for F and h , inexact solution of subproblems, and other details. Convergence analysis is given in Section 3. Numerical results for computing variational equilibria of game-theoretical models of electricity markets are presented in Section 4. In particular, we show that some specific implementations of our approach make it possible to solve problem instances which are too large to be handled by the popular PATH solver [7, 13] applied directly to the full problem without decomposition.
A few words about our notation are in order. For a closed convex set D and a point x, by P D (x) we denote the projection of x onto D. Given the set S h defined above and any polyhedral set D, we say that the (generalized) Slater constraint qualification holds for the set S h ∩ D if there exists x ∈ D such that h(x) < 0. The function F : R n ⇒ R n is strictly monotone if u − v, x − y > 0 for all x, y ∈ dom F and u ∈ F (x), v ∈ F (y) with x = y; and it is strongly monotone if there exists c > 0 such that u − v, x − y ≥ c x − y 2 for any choices above. We say that F : R n ⇒ R n is outer semicontinuous if for any sequences {x k }, {y k } such that {x k } →x and {y k } →ȳ with y k ∈ F (x k ), it holds thatȳ ∈ F (x). We say that a family of set-valued functions {F k } is equicontinuous on compact sets if for every compact set D and every ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for any x, y ∈ D with x − y < δ, for Note that since we assume that F is either continuous or maximal monotone, it is therefore outer semicontinuous. In addition, since S g ⊂ int (dom F ), it holds that F is locally bounded on S g [31] .
The algorithmic framework
In view of (5), having a current multiplier estimate µ k M for the h-constraint, perhaps the first natural approach would be to solve the subproblem
This is a valid option indeed, but it may have drawbacks, at least for some types of problem structures. For example, if (6) involves a general nonlinear (and possibly nonmonotone) mapping F , it may prevent us from taking full advantage of some special structure of the set S g (e.g., S g may be block-separable). The same comment applies to the nonlinearity of the derivative of h. Another issue is that the set S g in (6) may be unbounded (even if S h ∩ S g were bounded), in which case (6) is not guaranteed to have solutions if F is merely continuous/monotone. For these reasons, we shall consider various approximations to F and h that include (6) itself as an option, possibly regularized by a variable-metric proximal term to induce solvability of subproblems if needed. The algorithm is as follows.
, and a positive (semi)definite matrix Q k ∈ R n×n . Find x k+1 S , an approximate solution of the problem
3. The Master Problem: Choose a finite set X k+1 containing {x 0 S , . . . ,
with the associated w Some comments are in order. In Step 1, choosing a feasible starting point is needed to guarantee that the master problems (9) are feasible for all k. When h is not affine, the role of the condition h(x 0 S ) < 0 is to ensure that the Slater constraint qualification holds for the master problems (9) for all k, so that there exist Lagrange multipliers associated to the h-constraint in (9) . If h is affine, then (9) is a linearly constrained problem and the existence of Lagrange multipliers is automatic. That said, computing a (strictly) feasible starting point may be nontrivial in some applications. For this reason, Section 2.5 below presents a modification of the algorithm in which the h-constraints are relaxed by introducing slack variables, and computing a starting feasible point is required only for the set S g (recall that this set is assumed to be simple in our context).
The options for approximations F k and H k in the subproblems, as well as an augmentedLagrangian type modification µ k of the multiplier estimate µ k M , will be discussed in Section 2.1 below. As for the regularization matrix Q k , it should generally be taken as zero if F (and then also F k , for natural choices) is known to be strongly monotone; if strong monotonicity does not hold then Q k should be positive definite (e.g., a multiple of the identity; but more sophisticated choices may be useful depending on the structure [28] ). The notion of acceptable approximate solutions of subproblems is discussed in Section 2.2.
The set X k+1 in the master problem contains previous solutions of subproblems, but we could also add additional points. Section 2.3 shows that, at least if the projection onto the simpler set S g is easy, we can compute explicitly (at negligeable computational cost) points that are improvements over the previous iterates in the sense that they are closer to the solution set of (1).
Some remarks concerning reasonable stopping rules for Algorithm 2.1 will be given in Section 2.4.
Approximating the data in the subproblems
We next discuss the options for approximating the problem data in the subproblems. Roughly speaking, possible choices range from the simplest ones of taking the fixed values computed at the previous master solution x k M , pass through the Newtonian approximation centered at x k M , and arrive to taking the functions themselves ("exact approximation"). Furthermore, different options can be combined. For example, in the differentiable case, we can fix some components of the functions at x k M and use Newtonian approximations for the other components. In fact, we found such combinations to be the most efficient ones in our numerical results reported in Section 4.
To be deemed admissable, approximating objects must satisfy the following four basic conditions:
is maximal monotone and its domain contains dom F , (10b)
The mapping approximations. As already commented, F k estimates F near x k M . Some examples are:
Note that all these approximations are (maximal) monotone if F is (maximal) monotone, and that F k const is maximal monotone regardless of any assumptions. We would like to emphasize that even if F is nonmonotone, we can always choose a maximal monotone approximation F k . For example, taking F k const . Also, for specific applications there may exist other (more sophisticated options) of choosing a monotone approximation F k for a nonmonotone F . One example will be discussed in the sequel in the context of VI associated to generalized Nash equilibrium problems and our numeriocal results in Section 4.
Approximations of the derivative of the h-constraint. Similarly, the function H k estimates the derivative h near the point x k M , while preserving the monotonicity property (of derivatives of convex functions). Some examples are:
Note that for all the cases in (12), because of the convexity of h, the following monotonicity property holds:
Since
Multiplier modifications. Choices of µ k (x) different from µ k M are possible if there are linear equality constraints in the definition of the set S h (formally, in our setting this would correspond to taking two inequalities with opposite signs). Suppose that these equality constraints are given byh(x) = Ax − a, where A and a are a matrix and a vector of appropriate dimensions, respectively. We could then use the augmented Lagrangian choice for the corresponding multipliers:μ
where r k > 0 is the penalty parameter, and we took into account that x k M ∈ S h and sõ
It can be seen that this choice satisfies the conditions in (10).
Jacobi-type approximations in the block-separable case. To conclude this section, we consider the important special case where S g is a product of convex sets. That is,
Having chosen the approximations F k and H k , the matrix Q k , and taking µ k (x) = µ k M , we can write the functionF k for the subproblem by blocks:
and for every i = 1, 2, . . . , m, define the Jacobi-like approximationsF k
where
, . . . , x k Mm ) is the vector with all the blocks of variables, except for the i-th, fixed to the master solution. The corresponding estimatê F k Jacobi : R n → R n for the subproblem is then given bŷ
Accordingly, the objects in (8) take the form
And, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , m, we define the Jacobi-like approximations F k
Jacobi and H k Jacobi (x) satisfy all the properties in (10) . Moreover, since for every i = 1, 2, . . . , m and x i , y i ∈ R n i it holds that
it follows that ifF k were monotone, strictly monotone or strongly monotone, thenF k Jacobi i would inherit the same property; and therefore so wouldF k Jacobi . We again comment that in some applications (for example, VI associated to generalized Nash equilibrium problems, see Section 4) the full function F (x) = (F 1 (x), . . . , F n (x)) is nonmonotone but each component F i is monotone in the variable x i . So, even if the approximations F k Newton and F k exact could be nonmonotone, the approximations F k Newton-Jacobi and F k exact-Jacobi are monotone in that case. As we found F k Newton-Jacobi particularly useful in our numerical experiments, we shall next state it formally. By the definition above, we have F k
, and so
Then if F i (x) is monotone in the variable x i , we have that F k Newton-Jacobi i (x i ) is monotone and so is F k Newton-Jacobi (x). The motivation for the Jacobi approach is that we can take advantage of the separable structure of S g when solving the subproblems even when F is not separable. Specifically, it can be seen that x k+1 S solves the subproblem VI(F k Jacobi , S g ) if and only if the components (
Thus, the subproblems in Algorithm 2.1 decompose according to the structure of S g . Clearly, such decomposition is also achieved for F k Newton-Jacobi (x).
Inexact solution of subproblems
By approximate solution of subproblem (7) we mean computing some
where e k ∈ R n is the error term accounting for inexactness. This definition of approximate solutions of variational problems had been employed, e.g., in [26, 33] . In our convergence analysis, we shall use the following two approaches to controlling inexactness. One is the "relative-error" type:
or its stronger version
The second rule is the "asumptotically exact" type:
The first rule is more constructive, as it essentially means that the relative error (the ratio between the size of the error term e k and the size of the step
S ) in solving the subproblems needs to be small enough but can be fixed by the value of the parameter σ (which need not tend to zero); see [35, 28] and references therein for discussions of the advantages of this relative-error approach. That said, verifying (15) clearly requires the explicit knowledge of e k in (14) . Below we explain how e k can be constructed and the conditions (14) and (15) checked explicitly in the case of continuousF k . An advantage of the "assymptotical exactness" rule (17) is that it can be argued that in this case the explicit knowledge of e k in (14) is not necessary. The algorithm used to solve subproblems (7) can be truncated according to any suitable internal criteria, provided the precision is progressively tightened along the iterations of the outer Algorithm 2.1. This would generate, at each step, some unknown error term e k in (14) . But as long as the inexactness in solving the subproblems (however it is measured) asymptotically vanishes, it seems valid that the error written in any other form, for example (14) , must also tend to zero.
Suppose now thatF k is continuous (single-valued) and strongly monotone (recall that a monotone approximation F k of F always exists even if F is nonmonotone, and strong monotonicity ofF k can be induced by adding the proximal regularization with Q k positive definite when needed). Let an Algorithm A (any suitable algorithm for solving VI(F k , S g )) generate a sequence {y k,i } which, if continued infinitely, is known to converge to the exact solutionx k+1 S of the subproblem VI(F k , S g )) as i → ∞. This solution is unique, becauseF k is strongly monotone. It holds that
Define the auxiliary sequences {z k,i } and {e k,i } by
Since, by continuity ofF k and of the projection operator, {z k,i } also converges tox Observe now that
which means that, at each iteration of Algorithm A, z k,i solves the problem VI(F k + e k,i , S g ). In other words, the condition (14) holds at every iteration i for x k+1 S = z k,i and e k = e k,i
with the known e k,i defined above. Since {e k,i } → 0 as i → ∞, for any reasonable criterion of measuring approximations Algorithm A would yield in a finite number of iterations an approximate solution x k+1 S = z k,i for the subproblem VI(F k , S g ) with the known, and thus controllable, error e k = e k,i .
The only computational issue with the presented construction is the projection onto S g to construct the auxiliary points z k,i . However, this projection can be explicit for some problems (e.g., onto a box). Also, it may be already computed by Algorithm A in the course of its iterative procedure anyhow. For example, one of the most natural stopping conditions for VI(F k , S g ) is precisely to check whether y k,i − z k,i is small (this is the so-called natural residual of VI [12] ; in particular, if the natural residual is zero then y k,i = z k,i =x k+1 S is the exact solution).
Managing the feasible set of the master problem
The basic choice is to take X k+1 = {x 0 S , . . . , x k+1 S }. As already mentioned, to ensure feasibility of the master problems (9) it should hold that x 0 M = x 0 S ∈ S h ∩ S g , and for the existence of Lagrange multipliers h(x 0 S ) < 0 if h is not affine. However, when F is monotone and the projection onto S g is cheap (and this is indeed the case for many applications of interest), we can generate at negligeable computational cost some additional "improved" points that are closer to the solution set than the past iterates. This procedure is based on separation/projection ideas, e.g., [22, 33] .
In this strategy we explicitly state that X k ⊂ X k+1 for all k, i.e., no points are ever deleted from the feasible set of the previous master problem; points can only be added. Then
On the other hand, ifx is any solution of VI(F, S h ∩ S g ), since x k M ∈ S h ∩ S g it holds that w, x k M −x ≥ 0 wherew ∈ F (x). Then monotonicity of F (actually, the weaker pseudomonotonicity property is enough here) implies that w k M , x k M −x ≥ 0. Hence, for every k, the solution set of VI(F, S h ∩ S g ) lies in the halfspace
Thus, in view of (18) , all the previous master problem solutions are separated from the solution set of VI(F, S h ∩ S g ) by the hyperplane {x : w k M , x − x k M = 0}. In fact, as there seem to be no reasons for the inequality (18) to hold as equality, the separation should be expected to be strict for most points. It is then clear that projecting onto the separating hyperplane (can also be with under-or over-relaxation), would move the previous iterates closer to the solution set, thus giving better approximations to the solution [33] .
In addition, previous solutions of subproblems could be considered too, i.e., the points with the property
If there are such points then they can be projected/improved also. That said, since x j S ∈ S h need not hold in general, the existence of candidates to project of this kind is not a given (unlike the case with the previous master problem solutions for which the separation property always holds).
Summarizing, we can choose any subset
and define
where β z ∈ (0, 2) is over/under relaxation parameter (β z = 1 corresponds to the projection onto the separating hyperplane). See [33] for formal justifications.
Stopping conditions
One reasonable stopping criterion for Algorithm 2.1 is based on monitoring, after solving the subproblem VI(F k , K g ), the quantity
The motivation for (19) comes from the stopping test of the cutting-plane algorithm for maximizing the dual function (3) in the original Dantzig-Wolfe method for the linear program (2) . For this problem, using the linearity of the data and the fact that µ k M ⊥ h(x k M ) (since these solve (4)), we have that
i.e., ∆ k measures how well the dual function θ is approximated by its cutting-plane model θ k at the current dual iterate µ k M . It is standard to stop the cutting-plane method when ∆ k becomes small enough [2, Sec. 9.3.2].
Let us now go back to the variational setting. Suppose x k+1 S is an inexact solution of the suproblem VI(F k , K g ) in the sense of (14) . Since x k M ∈ S g , it then holds that
We can write v
S ). Then, for the inexactness criterion (15), we have that
If Q k is positive definite, then ∆ k = 0 implies
) (see Proposition 3.2 below). A value of ∆ k close to zero means that the difference between the points x k+1 S and x k M is small, which justifies the stopping test based on ∆ k .
Relaxing the constraints in the master problem
We now consider the option of relaxing the h-constraints by introducing slack variables. This feature can be useful when computing a feasible starting point in S h ∩ S g is nontrivial. A starting point in S g is still needed, but recall that it is assumed to be a simple set in our context.
Suppose that at an iteration k ≥ 0 we have a finite subset X k+1 of S g containing the subproblems solutions {x 0 S , . . . , x k+1 S }. We define the relaxed master feasible set
and the function
× {ζ k z}, where ζ k > 0 is a scalar parameter. Then the relaxed master problem consists of solving
Note that the set D k is always nonempty and satisfies the Slater constraint qualification automatically.
The new algorithm is given below.
2. The Subproblem: Choose the functionF k as in Algorithm 2.1 and find x k+1 S , a solution of the problem VI(F k , S g ). Note that solutions of the subproblems and of the master problems belong to the set S g , but not necessarily to S h . In Proposition 3.3 below, we shall see that the z-component of the master solution is actually uniquely defined and is of the form z k+1 = µ k+1 M /ζ k .
Convergence analysis
We first formalize the arguments that show that the algorithm is well-defined, i.e., that all the subproblems and all the master problems have solutions.
As discussed above, we can always choose F k to be maximal monotone (even if F is not), so thatF k would be maximal monotone with its domain containing the domain of F . Moreover, F k can always be made strongly monotone by taking the matrix Q k positive definite when needed. Then maximal monotonicity and strong monotonicity ofF k ensure the existence of the unique solution to subproblem VI(F k , S g ) (by [32, Theorem 5] ). In addition, as already discussed above, our choice of the starting points in both Algorithm 2.1 and Algorithm 2.2 ensures that all the master problems are always feasible and satisfy constraint qualifications, so that there exist Lagrange multipliers associated to the solutions (if any). Now, the master problems are variational inequalities either with a continuous mapping or with a maximal monotone one over nonempty compact feasible sets. Solutions to this type of problems exist, by [ We start our convergence analysis by establishing some key properties of the master problems solutions in Algorithm 2.1. 
For any such multiplier
µ k+1 M it holds that x k+1 M solves VI(F (·)+[h (·)] µ k+1 M , conv X k+1 ).
If for any x ∈ S g and any
v ∈ [F (x k+1 M ) + [h (x k+1 M )] µ k+1 M ] ∩ [−N conv X k+1 (x k+1 M )] it holds that v, x − x k+1 M < 0 then x ∈ conv X k+1 . 4. If x k+1 M is a solution of VI(F (·) + [h (·)] µ k+1 M , S g ) then x k+1 M solves VI(F, S g ∩ S h ).
On the next iteration (k
Proof. Since conv X k+1 is a polyhedral set, the linearity of h in the first case or the Slater constraint qualification in the second case guarantee that
and ≥ 0 for all x ∈ conv X k+1 . Thus, if this inequality does not hold for some x ∈ S g , it must be the case that x ∈ conv X k+1 .
Suppose now that
M is a Lagrange multiplier associated to the h-constraint, we have
and hence,
which establishes the fourth assertion. Finally, since by (10) it holds that
then the previous item implies that it solves VI(F, S g ∩ S h ).
Note that, by the third item of Proposition 3.1, it follows that for the gap defined in (19) whenever ∆ k < 0 we have that x k+1 S ∈ conv X k . Thus, as long as ∆ k < 0, the feasible set of the master problem keeps growing, improving the approximation of the set S g . If the subproblems are solved exactly then x k+1 S ∈ conv X k for some k implies that ∆ k ≥ 0 (actually ∆ k = 0). Then, ifF k is at least strictly monotone (which can always be ensured by taking the matrix Q k positive definite if needed) it holds that
is a solution of the problem VI(F, S g ∩ S h ). Proposition 3.2 LetF k be strictly monotone (e.g., Q k is positive definite). Suppose that in Algorithm 2.1 it holds that
is an approximate solution, with error e k , of the subproblem VI(F k , S g ) in the sense of (14) , and since x k M ∈ S g , for the associated v
for any multiplier µ associated to the h-constraints. Hence, µ k+1 M is uniquely defined and satisfies (24) .
Also, it holds that
which establishes the second assertion. The last assertion follows from the same considerations as those used in Proposition 3.1 for Algorithm 2.1.
We note that for Algorithm 2.2 the condition x
. This is the price to pay for the convenience of relaxing the h-constraint, as the master problem solutions x k M may no longer belong to S h . Rather, they approach this set asymptotically.
We are now in position to state the main convergence results for the Dantzig-Wolfe schemes described above. 
S )}, with the subproblems (7) solved approximately in the sense of (14) with the associated error sequence {e k } satisfying (15) or (17) . In the case of Algorithm 2.2, let {ζ k } → +∞ as k → ∞.
Then it holds that 1. The sequence {∆ k } converges to zero.
2. IfF k are strongly monotone uniformly with respect to k and the approximation rule (17) is used, or if the matrices Q k are uniformly positive definite and either (15) 
, the sequence {Q k } is bounded, the families of functions {F k }, {H k } and {µ k } are equicontinuous on compact sets, and in the case of the relative-error inexactness rule condition (15) is strengthened to (16), then for every accumulation point (x,μ) of the sequence {(x k M , µ k M )} the pointx is a solution of VI(F, S h ∩ S g ) whileμ is a multiplier associated to the h-constraint.
Proof. Using (20) in the case when subproblems are solved inexactly according to the rule (15) , and (23) if the rule (17) is employed, we see that
Let {k j } be any subsequence of indices such that lim j→∞ ∆ k j =∆. Passing onto a further subsequence, if necessary, we can assume that {(x
. Also, since under the stated assumptions F is locally bounded on S g , the sequence {w k j M } is bounded and we can assume that {w
By definition (19) , we have that
Fix any index j. Then for every i > j we have that x k j +1 S ∈ X k i . As a result, by the second item of Proposition 3.1 in case of Algorithm 2.1 or of Proposition 3.3 in case of Algorithm 2.2, it holds that w
M ≥ 0. Passing onto the limit as i → ∞ in the relation above, we conclude that
Now passing onto the limit as j → ∞ in the latter relation, we obtain that
Hence,∆ ≥ 0. Together with (25) this proves the first assertion.
solves approximately VI(F k , S g ) in the sense of (14), there exists v
the stated assumptions F is locally bounded on S g and outer semicontinuous, we can assume that the sequence {u
Next, note that {e k } → 0. In the case of the inexactness rule (17) this is explicit. In the case of rule (16) it is an obvious consequence since {Q k } is bounded,
→ 0, and the right-hand side of (16) is quadratic in the latter quantity while the left-hand side is linear.
Now passing onto the limit in (26) as j → ∞ and using (27) , we obtain that
Sinceμ ≥ 0, the convexity of h implies that
Then, by (28), we obtain that
For a sequence generated by Algorithm 2.1, {x k M } ⊂ S h ∩ S g and µ k M , h(x k M ) = 0 for all k. Hence, by continuity,x ∈ S h ∩ S g and μ, h(x) = 0. For a sequence generated by Algorithm 2.2, taking the limit in (24) as k → ∞ and recalling the parameter choice {ζ k } → +∞, it again follows thatx ∈ S h ∩ S g and μ, h(x) = 0.
In either case, we havex ∈ S h ∩ S g andū ∈ F (x), with (29) yielding
i.e.,x is a solution of VI(F, S h ∩ S g ), as stated. The fact thatμ is a Lagrange multiplier associated to the h-constraint follows from (28) . It is clear that the families of functions {F k const }, {H k const } and {H k exact} defined above are equicontinuous on compact sets. For a bounded sequence {x k M }, both {F k Newton } and {H k Newton } are equicontinuous. When F is single-valued continuous, the family {F k exact } is equicontinuous. Finally, µ k (x) = µ k M is always equicontinuous while the augmented Lagrangian optionμ k (x) for linear constraints is equicontinuous if the sequence of augmentation parameters {r k } is bounded.
Numerical Results
In this section, we describe a simplified game-theoretical model for electricity markets, and present our numerical results for computing the associated variational equilibria. For more sophisticated but related models we refer to [19, 20, 21] . For our purposes of validating the decomposition approach to variational inequalities (rather than solving the electricity models as such) the version considered here is sufficient.
Energy markets as generalized Nash games
Let N agents generate electric energy for sale. Each agent i owns n i plants whose total generation is represented by a vector q i ∈ R n i + . The energy owned by this agent is 1 i q i , where 1 i = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ R n i .
The unitary energy price in the market depends on the total amount of energy produced by all agents. We model it by a quadratic concave function of one variable, that is the total energy, so p : R → R. The exogenous coefficients defining this quadratic function are market-dependent and are given below.
The vector of all the agents' generation is denoted by q −0 = (q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q N ) ∈ R n (this peculiar notation will be clear soon). Letting 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ R n , with n = N i=1 n i , the total amount of energy available in the market is 1 q −0 . This means that the i-th agent will be paid
If, to generate q i , the agent incurs an operating (convex) cost c i (q i ), the agent's profit is given by
The profit of each agent depends on the generation level of all the agents in the market. In turn, each generation level is constrained by technological limitations of the power plants: for certain sets Q i ⊂ R n i , the relation q i ∈ Q i must hold. In our simplied modelling, Q i = [0, U i ] for some U i ∈ R n i + , noting that in a realistic model the set Q i is given by complex relations expressing how different technologies (thermal, nucleaer, hydraulic, eolic) generate power.
An additional constraint for the generation levels q i refers to the fact that agents are encouraged to satisfy the market demand d > 0. We let q 0 ≥ 0 denote a slack variable, measuring the deficit of energy in the market, sometimes called load shedding. Then, if for each agent i, the vector q −i = (q 0 , q 1 , . . . , q i−1 , q i+1 , . . . , q N ) denotes the generation level of all the other agents, including load shedding, the relation
Summing up, the i-th agent tries to maximize profit by solving the (concave) problem
The coordination, or regulation, of the market is done by the Independent System Operator (ISO), whose actions in the market are considered as those of an additional player (this is a so-called bounded rationality model). Accordingly, letting the ISO be player number 0, if the energy deficit is penalized with a price P > 0, the ISO tries to maximize the social welfare by solving
where D(q −0 ) = {w 0 ∈ R : 0 ≤ w 0 ≤ U 0 , w 0 + 1 q −0 = d} with U 0 being the maximal allowed level of load shedding. As a result, for i = 0, . . . , N , the convex functions θ i : R 1+n → R given by
define a generalized Nash game with N + 1 players (the ISO and the N agents). In this game, each player tries to maximize profit by solving
It is known that finding a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of this game is equivalent to solving a quasi-variational inequality problem, see [10] . Quasi-variational problems are very hard to solve. Fortunately, in our case, it is possible to compute some GNE points (not all) by solving a variational inequality instead. These points are called variational equilibria and have some good/important properties from the economic point of view, see [11, 23] . For our problem, it is shown in [24] that variational equilibria are solutions to VI(F, S g ∩ S h ) where
In our model each function θ i (q) is convex and differentiable in the variable q i . So the function ∇ q i θ i (q) is monotone in the i-th component of the variable q, but in general it is not monotone on the full variable q. Therefore, the singled-valued function F defining the variational problem (1) is nonmonotone. Observe that it also couples all the variables.
Our Dantzig-Wolfe strategy can be applied to nonmonotone single-valued functions F , simply by taking monotone approximations to F in the subproblems. In particular, any family F k const , F k Newton-Jacobi , or F k exact-Jacobi can be used. Another specificity of our game is that the demand constraint, that is the set S h , couples all variables q i . Without this constraint, the feasible set would be separable. This makes the considered game particularly suitable for application of our decomposition schemes.
Battery of problems
We implemented Algorithm 2.1 in Matlab version 7.11(R2010b). The runs were done on a PC operating under Ubuntu 11.04 with a Core(TM)2 Duo 2.00GHz processor and 4GB of memory.
We created six market configurations of the generalized Nash game, by taking N = 5 agents and considering a mix with n power plants, for n ∈ {100, 250, 1000, 2500, 5000, 10000} .
As n increases, the configurations become harder and harder to solve directly, without decomposition. Also the subproblems become harder, as we assume that each agent owns the same number of plants, equal to n/5.
Other values of the model parameters are as follows.
1. The entries of the maximum generation capacity vector U i are random numbers in [0, 10] while the maximum allowed deficit is fixed to U 0 = 5.
The demand is taken equal to
, corresponding to 80% of the market generation capacity.
3. The deficit price is set at P = 120.
4. The unitary price p is a quadratic concave function such that p(0) = P , p (0) = 0 and p(1.5d) = 0.
The operating cost is of the form
where b i ∈ R n i and M i ∈ R n i ×n i is a diagonal positive definite matrix. The corresponding values are generated randomly between [30, 60] and [0.4, 0.8], respectively.
With this data, the simplified model is set up in a manner ensuring that at a variational equilibrium of the game will have no deficit (q 0 = 0) and the price will be equal to p(d) = P (1 − 1 1.5 2 ). As a way of ensuring correctness of the implementation, we checked that these values were obtained in all of our numerical results below.
Results
For each of the six market configurations, we randomly generated 10 problem instances. For each instance, we apply Algorithm 2.1 using five approximations for F :
Since the h-constraint is linear, we used the exact family H k exact and likewise for the multipliers.
We also tried to solve the problem directly, without decomposition, using PATH [7, 13] . For the two largest configurations (n = 5000, 1000) PATH could no longer be used, stopping by lack of memory. With our computer and for the considered instances, when n = 5000 the solver stalled after about 4 hours. Also, since the larger configurations become time consuming, for these we only run the faster decomposition alternatives, in our case F k const and F k Newton-Jacobi . Regarding specifics of the implementation of Algorithm 2.1, all the subproblems and master problems are themselves solved using PATH. Our focus here is on comparing various approximation options; for this reason we do not report on the variants with inexact solution of subproblems, with generating additional points via projections, or relaxing the master problems.
For the cases n = 100, 250, 500, 1000, and the options F k const , F k Newton-Jacobi , and F k exact-Jacobi , subproblems in variables q i followed the decomposition pattern induced by the product
With this decomposition, decision variables are precisely those of each player. For the larger configurations we used instead the product S g = n/250
We use as stopping rules the following criteria. In PATH the stopping test employs the residual of the full problem based on the Fischer-Burmeister merit function [12] . For smaller problems we used the default 10 −6 , relaxed to 10 −2 for the larger problems. For the decomposition approaches the stopping criterion is
where ∆ k is defined in (19) . As discussed in Section 2.4, this is a natural stopping condition in the decomposition framework, as the access to the full problem, and thus to its residual, is not presumed. All results are reported in Table 2 in the Appendix, and interpreted in the two comparative Figures 1 and 2 below. For each configuration, we averaged over the 10 instances the results for each method. The table reports the mean CPU time in seconds, the mean residual (the infinite-norm of the natural merit function [12] for VI(F (·) + [h (·)] µ k M , S g ) at the master solution x k M ), and the mean infinite-norm of the difference between x k M and x k+1 S at termination. Note that the latter distance and the residual are not parts of the decomposition stopping test; these were computed a posteriori to confirm that an approximate solution of the problem was obtained. We also report the maximum CPU time in seconds for each configuration, to give an estimation on how the data dispersion affected each method.
The main point we would like to stress is that for the configurations having n ≥ 5000, applying PATH directly appears no longer possible even after relaxing the stopping tolerance from the default 10 −6 to 10 −2 . Of course, the exact threshold depends on the specific computer and implementation, yet there is always a threshold. On the other hand, some of the approximation options in the decomposition technique still succeed in solving the larger configurations in reasonable computational times. In order to see the benefit of decomposing, we took as reference the CPU time taken by a direct application of PATH and computed the ratio between the CPU times of each decomposition method and the reference one. Figure 1 shows the corresponding ratios. We should remark though that Figure 1 is intended merely to illustrate the dynamics of the comparison as the size grows and should not be taken literally. The reason is that, being a Newton-type method, when PATH works (i.e., for problems not too large), it provides highly accurate solutions. A comparable level of accuracy cannot be expected from the decomposition approach, of course.
The ordinate in Figure 1 uses a logarithmic scale, for convenience. In the figure, when for a given method the value represented by a colored bar lies above the 0-ordinate (corresponding to 10 0 in the logarithmic scale), the decomposition method took longer than the direct approach with PATH. By contrast, when the bar is below the ordinate 10 0 , the decomposition Figure 1 : Time ratios (decomposition divided by PATH), configurations with n ≤ 2500 method was faster than PATH. The plot in Figure 1 shows a natural behaviour. A direct application of PATH is very efficient for the smaller to medium sized problems. But as the size grows, decomposition becomes more and more competitive. For n = 1000, the F k Newton-Jacobi decomposition already outperforms the direct approach. And for n = 2500, three of the decomposition approaches become faster than PATH, with the F k Newton-Jacobi approximation being the best one.
Recall once again that PATH applied to the full problem stalls for n ≥ 5000, while some decomposition approaches still work in reasonable time. Figure 2 compares the performance of F k const and F k Newton-Jacobi , which are the two best options for this specific type of problem and for the larger configurations. The plot shows the corresponding mean CPU times in seconds for each configuration, ranging from n = 100 to n = 10000. We observe that F k Newton-Jacobi shows a better scalability with respect to the problem size.
Concluding remarks
We have presented a family of decomposition methods for variational inequalities, that can be applied with maximal monotone operators (possibly set-valued) or single-valued continuous operators (possibly nonmonotone). The approach allows for various kinds of approximations of the problem data and its derivatives in the single-valued case, as well as inexact solution of subproblems. The resulting algorithmic patterns are shown to be convergent under reasonable assumptions on the variational problem. The decomposition scheme is highly versatile and makes it possible to exploit structural properties of the variational problem, even if the operator therein is not separable. The benefit of having such a flexible setting is assessed by our numerical experiments, computing a variational equilibrium for generalized Nash games arising when modeling strategic interactions in electricity markets. Our numerical results show that, even with an extremely simplified modelling of the power system, large instances become untractable with a direct solution method, and can only be solved by decomposition. Regarding scalability, among all the considered variants and for our battery of tests, the decomposition method using a combination of Newton and Jacobi approximations appears to be the best one. 
